

EFFECTS-BASED PLANNING: TIME TO THINK ANEW AND ACT ANEW

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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by

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ABSTRACT

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The Joint Force's ability to successfully operate in a violent, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) environment is critical to the future security of our nation. Given this environment and to set conditions for success a Department of Defense adoption of an effects-based approach to planning is the best adaptation at the theater level. This paper briefly examines joint and service doctrine positions on planning, effects, and the purpose each plays given the complexities of planning and executing in the current environment. Planning and effects practices in Iraq will be the focus for illustration of potential and current problems faced when these two are not integrated. This paper will then discuss the doctrinal and organizational changes required to fuse effects and planning into an integrated process across all the planning ranges: deliberate, future, and crisis planning. The final discussion point focuses on the institutional adaptations required to prepare leaders and organizations to effectively incorporate an effects-based approach to planning and decisionmaking into current joint processes. This proposed approach will better prepare leaders and the overall Joint Force to act in concert with multinational and interagency partners to address the challenges of the future environment.

EFFECTS-BASED PLANNING: TIME TO THINK ANEW AND ACT ANEW

The current strategic security environment has been characterized as volatile, uncertain, complex, and adaptive (VUCA). Given these characteristics, referring to operations in terms of task, purpose, and objective - although still important - is no longer sufficient to address the nuances in today's security environment. In order to better address the complexity and these uncertainties, the Joint Force must adapt and incorporate an effects-based approach to planning.

In 2005, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) directed a change to the strategic planning approach making it more "adaptive" to ensure that geographic Combatant Commanders were maintaining relevant plans in such a dynamic and uncertain security environment.¹ Although seemingly an over-centralized process constantly involving the SECDEF, this approach has served to help provide national strategic-level planning guidance and dialog concerning assumptions, conditions, and desired and undesired outcomes. In order to account for these same dynamic conditions, the Joint Force must also examine adaptive approaches to theater level planning. The endstate goal for both of these adaptive approaches is an integrated military more capable of conducting a broad range of military operations with better visibility on achieving the desired outcomes. The emerging concept of effects-based planning (EBP) is the best solution for focusing joint planning on the desired outcomes across the entire range of military operations.

An effects-based approach (EBA), seemingly a fad thrust upon the military in the early twenty-first century with no doctrinal foundation and little academic discussion, has become an increasingly important concept for doctrinal application in joint military

planning, execution, and assessment.² The Army and the Marine Corps remain skeptical that the concept has provided any greater clarity to the current Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) and firmly believe that this concept is not for application at tactical levels. The JOPP is considered an objectives-based methodology driven by established national and strategic objectives as outlined in Joint Publication 3.0, *Joint Operations*, and Joint Publication 5.0 (JP 5.0), *Joint Operation Planning*. These same publications now emphasize *effects* as one of the critical elements in operational design, and state that incorporation of effects into the planning process helps provide the clarification of the dynamic causal relationship between objectives and the subsequently assigned tasks.³

The next logical step is the continued integration and application of EBP in current Joint, Service, and even interagency methodologies to provide a more encompassing and integrated planning process given the strategic security environment encountered within most theaters of operation. Desired effects must no longer be seen solely as an outcome of operations, but rather as the focus which provides interdependent connectivity to planning, execution, and assessment of all military and interagency operations within a theater. Given this interdependency, effects-based planning considerations must pervade from strategic through the tactical levels in order to ensure true unity of purpose and effort.

From personal experience within Multinational Corps in Iraq (MNC-I) and dealing with the Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I) headquarters for twelve months,⁴ successful application of EBP at the theater level requires understanding and focused application down to the tactical level. This research project demonstrates that effects-based

planning is the best approach at this level given a complex security environment, but that the following three adaptations must occur to set the conditions for success. First, the entire Joint Force and Interagency must accept an adaptive and integrated joint planning process linking the objectives, national military through operational, to the tasks, through a more measured description of the desired and undesired effects. Second, doctrinal and subsequent organizational adaptations are required to integrate an effects-based planning approach and assessment across the staff, externally with interagency partners, and across all planning horizons at the theater level. Finally, institutional changes are required from junior officer through senior-leader education to embrace and prepare leaders to integrate effects into planning and decisionmaking at the theater level.

Background

In October 2001, the United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) published the first version of a white paper titled “Effects-based Operations (EBO)” which states that an effects-based approach provides a better understanding of the adversary because it entails a system of system analysis.⁵ A systems analysis includes an increased involvement of other national agencies and will lead to better-reasoned options to engage potential adversaries and an increased ability to adapt operations more quickly in response to the dynamic environment of future conflict.”⁶ Although an EBA was an emerging concept prior to this date, it was not unintentional that this conceptual paper was released only one month after the attacks of 11 September 2001 and would validate the volatility and uncertainty that would lie ahead. The white paper further defined EBO as a process for obtaining desired strategic outcomes or “effects”

on the enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of military and nonmilitary capabilities at all levels of conflict.⁷ Although this process definition too narrowly focuses on the enemy and does not account for the effects on the entire operational environment, it follows that an effects-based planning process must account for military and non-military capabilities. A broader definition found in JP 5.0, one that will be referred to throughout this paper, states that effects “describe system behavior in the operational environment” — desired effects are the *conditions* related to achieving objectives.⁸ The white paper further refines an “effect” as the physical, functional, or psychological outcome, event, or consequence that results from specific military or non-military actions.⁹ This refinement is important because it accurately captures the domains in which future conflict will occur and clearly portrays the complexity involved in planning for operations to achieve desirable outcomes while avoiding undesirable ones.

Over the past seven years, the effects-based approach has undergone rigorous assessment and debate as it evolved from being first a white paper, then a “Commander’s Handbook,” and finally joint doctrine in 2006. There remain several dissenting opinions. The U.S. Army feels that an EBA is not a new concept yet worthy of great doctrinal adaptation at the tactical level because it merely serves to restate and potentially even confuse the validated doctrinal concepts of “purpose and endstate.”¹⁰ The United States Marines Corps maintains a similar view as it acknowledges the importance in understanding the joint doctrinal concept, but ultimately neither service is willing to drastically change its doctrine concerning effects-based planning to coincide with Joint doctrine.¹¹

Joint operation planning is the overarching process within JOPES that guides Joint Force Commanders' development of theater plans for the employment of military capabilities within the context of national strategic objectives and national military strategy to shape events, meet contingencies, and respond to unforeseen crises.¹² Operational planning is the primary focus of JP 5.0 which states, "The use of effects in planning can help commanders and staffs determine the ways and means required to achieve objectives and use other elements of operational design more effectively."¹³ All players, military and non-military, operating at the theater level must have a clear understanding and appreciation of this process and relationship. In order to better prepare leaders at all levels to operate based on effects within a complex environment, there are several changes that must occur to doctrine, organization, and institutional norms in planning.

Joint Force Doctrinal Adaptations

The first change required is that the entire Joint Force and interagency participants accept and understand an integrated joint-planning process which links strategic and operational objectives to the required tasks through a more measured description of the desired and undesired effects. The current JOPP is "objectives-based," and the adaptation to an effects-based approach focuses more on a broader range of ways and means for attaining these same objectives. This is an important construct that is not clearly understood by the entire joint community. For example, in a *Parameters* article titled "*Effects-Based Operations: The Next American Way of War*," Tom McDaniel stated that effects-based "end states" are not the same as end states currently addressed in doctrine, and that military "objectives" may no longer be necessary as we

evolve this "new" American way of war.¹⁴ This is an unfortunate comment that leads to further skepticism by the Services. This statement fails to realize that, as outlined in JP 5.0, objectives must serve as the "yardstick" upon which desired and undesired effects are measured. Without objectives to guide effects, the establishment and subsequent measurement of effects potentially becomes a "self-fulfilling process" which would be difficult, if not impossible, to assess and refine.

Effects-based planning is an iterative planning cycle focused on objectives, but designed to establish, measure, and adjust to the conditions within the battlespace. Since entering the Service, military planners have learned to address missions in terms of task and purpose to provide clarity and unity of effort. Historically, planners have been charged with assigning a series of sequential and simultaneous tasks to subordinate units designed to reach this purpose and achieve assigned objectives such as geographic control, adversary defeat or destruction, or support of some greater political objective. However, today's planners, given the current complex conditions within each theater, must grapple with objectives that include: setting the conditions for a new democratic government to succeed; establishment of a viable national military force; enabling economic growth; or defeating an ideology-based insurgency. These are objectives that can no longer easily be described by mere task and purpose. There are degrees of achieving desired objectives that must now be identified and measured using an effects-based approach.

Under an effects-based approach, the measurement of objective accomplishment is termed a measure of performance.¹⁵ These complex objectives now require a series of tasks designed to cause an anticipated series of effects. The measurement of

success is termed a measure of effectiveness (MOE) which is designed to examine the conditions within a system as they are acted upon in order to accomplish the assigned objective.¹⁶

Planning to incorporate MOEs is a construct created to specifically address the nuances previously discussed which occur in a complex environment. It is not an easy construct to understand, but a critical one nonetheless needed to adequately address the desired and undesired conditions in route to objective achievement. Measures of performance and effectiveness can be planned at theater level, but not adequately assessed without support at the tactical level. It is therefore critical that the Services embrace an effects-based approach to planning and decisionmaking in order for the process to succeed in its intended purpose. As a doctrinal principal, planning at all levels from strategic through tactical is required to be nested. Effects-based planning is no different and therefore requires a pervading doctrinal focus from joint through service doctrine.

Obtaining concurrence on EBP within the joint and service communities is difficult enough, but does not address the third and probably most critical integrating element within this process: interagency participation. Joint operational planning efforts attempt to incorporate interagency capabilities to help shape, deter, stabilize, and eventually enable civil authority in accordance with doctrinal phasing for theater campaigns. Interagency partners have a diverse and powerful array of capabilities, yet currently lack the staff planning ability to integrate with military processes. An effects-based approach increases the emphasis on how to influence system functions across the entire operational environment.¹⁷ Adopting a functional approach across the entire operational

environment serves to expand the range of options and capabilities that might produce the desired effects. If the joint planning process would remain solely task, purpose, and objectives-based, the interagency actors could execute tasks and understand purpose, yet may struggle to address options for and their progress in attaining strategic or operational objectives. Effects considerations inherent in EBP provide a better focus for the interagency elements application of their capabilities to achieve desired outcomes.

For example, the interagency and coalition partners play a significant role in the U.S. strategy for *Victory in Iraq*. In this complex operational environment, our national strategy is focused on eight strategic pillars or objectives: (1) defeat the terrorists and neutralize the insurgency; (2) transition Iraq to security self-reliance; (3) help Iraqis form a national compact for democratic government; (4) help Iraq build government capacity; (5) provide essential services; (6) help Iraq strengthen its economy; (7) help Iraq strengthen the rule of law; and (8) promote civil rights.¹⁸ Monthly strategic progress assessments have been deemed essential by the SECDEF and National Security Council members given such a dynamic environment.¹⁹ These assessments are a necessary part of the overall “conditions-based strategy” that requires a periodic review of the effects generated over time in order to maintain a trajectory toward long-term success.²⁰

Each of these eight strategic objectives has at least three corresponding operational objectives within theater and numerous associated tactical tasks that require a balanced military and non-military approach. Consequently, tasks assigned to operational and tactical forces in this environment were no longer dependent solely on military accomplishment. These tasks were now based on setting both military and

environmental conditions deemed necessary to achieve the stated national military objectives. Some of these non-traditional military tasks includes: establishing effective local governance; assisting local authorities in maintaining security; preventing future enemy safe havens; rehabilitating health and educational facilities; and helping to set the economic conditions to prevent the spread of terrorism.²¹

The interdependence of the military and interagency capabilities was not fully understood until far too late. The military leadership in MNF-I and the Department of State were at times too focused on the security problem and failed to refocus the objectives to help set the required conditions. The need for a more holistic effects-based approach to planning and assessment was understood by some key leaders in the theater, yet the application of these two processes was new to both military and civilian agencies. Therefore, MNF-I, with interagency support, was required to apply a concept not fully developed, codified, or fully embraced by the Joint Force required to implement it.

Joint Force Doctrinal and Organizational Adaptations

The second set of adaptations required are doctrinal and the subsequent organizational changes needed to help guide an effects-based approach. The doctrinal practice of an effects-based approach must be clearly understood across the entire staff and guided by one individual responsible for oversight and the integration from planning through execution. Doctrine must also incorporate iterative effects development, assessment, and refinement across all planning horizons - crisis through contingency - at the theater level.

Currently, joint doctrine acknowledges effects as an integral part of the operational design and joint operational planning process. Effects are discussed as a product of mission analysis, with potential inclusion in the commander's intent, and refinement in course of action development. Although not explicitly stated, this would stand to reason that the J5 is responsible for effects development in accordance with the identified objectives. At the same time, joint doctrine states that the primary responsibility for effects collection and assessment falls upon the J3 with support from the J2.²² This assignment of responsibility is logical, yet discounts several staff principals and downplays the potential integration with interagency elements.

Contrary to current joint doctrine, MNF-I operates with four separate divisions responsible for effects as shown in Figure 1 below.²³ These divisions include Strategic Communications (STRATCOM), Strategic Operations (STRATOPS), Policy and




Figure 1. MNF-I Plans, Effects, & Assessment Alignment

Economy, and Strategic Plans and Assessment (SPA). Strategic Plans and Assessment is however only responsible for effects assessment, not their generation, in line with stated objectives. Although MNF-I fully realizes the importance of effects, its partitioning serves to create separate planning and effects processes that are not fully integrated. The feedback mechanisms are data-focused, non-analytical, and too segmented when presented to the Commander and fail to provide an adequate assessment for informed decisionmaking. These MNF-I staff elements report to different senior officers and are both too far removed from the campaign development process.²⁴ Over a 12 month period in 2006, there were very few refinements to the strategic effects chosen to measure and no changes to the strategic and operational objectives despite uncertain success along all lines of operation. This might imply that either the effects were not measuring the correct indicators or that the objectives were so broad that they did little to focus the process. In order to provide execution feedback to the planners, USJFCOM's original designs for an effects-based approach envisioned an effects working group and an effects cell, but each of these were under the J5 and J3 respectively.²⁵

The construct of effects development, assessment, and refinement capabilities must reside inside the J5 and J3 directorates in order to perform iterative effects-based planning and effects-driven decisionmaking. Effects are neither capabilities nor multipliers such as fires, mobility, information operations, or civil affairs, and therefore cannot be staffed separately from the core joint planning process. Effects are desired and undesired outcomes that must be elicited, prevented, or mitigated. Attempting to place effects under a similar construct as the previous fire support coordinator runs the

risk of assuming that effects are always “tangible things” that can be massed or applied. It is important to remember that effects are the complex relationships that exist within operations to help Commanders visualize the linkage between task and objective.

The entire staff has a vital role in defining and measuring these complex relationships, but the core responsibility must reside within plans and operations at the theater level. Therefore, the Chief of Staff (COS), and not a separate “Effects Coordinator,” would be the logical individual to remain responsible to the Commander for oversight of the effects-based approach in order to produce a holistic development and assessment of effects across multiple lines of operation. One counter argument to this doctrinal proposal is that the COS at operational or theater level is far too busy to hold this responsibility. In operational practice in Iraq, both the MNF-I and MNC-I COS have been far busier due to a lack of integration and focus than they ever would have been in maintaining oversight of an effects-based process. Both the J3 and the J5 would then be responsible to the COS for an iterative process that would enable a more rapid assessment and refinement to current and future operations. This is not significantly different than the current challenges of battle handover that face joint plans, operations, and assessment.²⁶

Although difficult and resource intensive, EBP and assessment must reside within each planning horizon, contingency through crisis action planning, to enable a more seamless transfer process at the theater level. The J5 already has a battlestaff within the contingency planning cell that includes representation from each staff directorate. Within MNC-I this battlestaff includes one effects planner which has “reach-back”²⁷ capability to a separate effects cell. Planning in this manner is, however, disjointed

because it requires working across two planning cells. In order to keep the entire process within the J5/J3, the lone effects planner must be augmented by at least ten other planners devoted solely to effects development, planning, and assessment. A partial list of functional joint capabilities for these planners must include logistical, informational, public affairs, civil affairs, interagency, fires, legal, reconstruction, political, and cultural. This subsequently builds the core effects-based planning staff directly into the contingency planning cell.

Both future and current operations must also have similar planning capacity to the contingency planning cell but they must have better-rounded active participants. The requirement exists for officers who are more versatile due to the limitations encountered when attempting to duplicate like capacity at all three levels. This collective group of versatile planners, while maintaining focus on the strategic and operational objectives and the previously determined effects, must be able to conduct crisis planning designed to provide the Commander options to address both the immediate crisis and the overall campaign objectives. When additional capability is required, the J3 works with the J5 to shift battlestaff members needed to address crisis action planning.

The characteristics required from these adaptive staff officers make them potentially some of the best and brightest men and women within the future joint staffs. They must be highly intelligent, well-rounded in the overall planning and current operations, and trusted agents of each staff principle. They must understand the full spectrum of non-lethal and lethal capabilities, including interagency, that are available to the Commander to achieve the desired objectives. These battlestaff members, much like their counterparts in the contingency plans cell, must attend joint planning group

meetings weekly to remain integrated with plans development and effects assessment feedback. They must range from attending the monthly effects assessment working groups as well as observing the daily operations updates. This hand-selected and trained, yet austere, group will in turn become the “honest brokers” for maintaining visibility on the critical linkage between objectives, effects, and the assigned tasks to achieve them. The problem then becomes how to develop these well-rounded and effects-minded renaissance officers for the twenty-first century.

Joint Force Institutional Adaptations

The final major set of adaptations required is institutional changes to Services’ professional military education curriculum. The Joint Force will only be able to translate its growing potential capabilities into reality by creating an integrated joint-interagency planning, decisionmaking, and execution methodology.²⁸ An EBA is the foundation to create a common methodology that is better understood by both military and interagency partners. To better understand the changes required within the institutional leader development model, the Joint Force must examine the content future leaders are required to learn; when these same future leaders must start development; and finally, how future leaders must learn and develop in order to become the renaissance officers who will serve on staffs or command at the theater level.

Each senior service college (SSC) is currently using the joint planning process and joint doctrine that incorporates the EBP into lessons and exercises. The problem, however, encountered within each SSC is that most of the students have not been previously exposed to an effects-based approach and are not prepared for an advanced academic approach to the concept. Given the complexities of today’s security

environment and the promise for a more complex future, the Joint Force can no longer afford to waste valuable time and resources on disparate and more linear approaches to leader development. Attempts to integrate effects into planning and execution are ongoing in both Iraq and Afghanistan with mediocre results primarily because the Joint Force is unprepared to execute this concept.²⁹ Moreover, the Joint Force must agree on an approach to future leader development, planning, and execution that will focus our efforts and resources to better prepare for the challenges that lie ahead.

This approach to leader development must be based on a set of agreed principles to guide the developmental process. Future leaders can no longer afford to learn in an incremental and sequential fashion given system and environmental factors such as: media; non-state actors; non-contiguous battlespace; complex environments; and complex mission sets like nation building and peace-keeping. The Joint Force must focus on developing future leaders who better understand system interdependencies, blurred combatant and non-combatant distinctions, soft power, and relationship of tactical actions, second order effects, and operational or strategic objectives.

The current Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) is a sound process and should remain the foundation for developing future planners and leaders. The current joint doctrinal terms “objectives-based” and “effects-based” must however become conceptual terms of the past. Future leaders must come to understand that there is only one process that inextricably links objectives, effects, and tasks. This is important to help senior leaders understand that an effects-based approach is merely a refinement of the current JOPP given the complexities encountered on today’s battlefield and projections for the future security environment. EBA is merely a

methodology designed to help focus efforts toward establishing conditions, tactical through strategic, that define a desired endstate, as well as, allow commanders to gauge their progress continuously.³⁰

In development of future leaders, the Joint Force, working together with interagency partners, must frame even the most tactical lessons within an operational or strategic context. This is essential to provide the strategic framework which affects all leader actions. Taxing leaders and forcing them to consider a problem, given second and third order intended and unintended effects at the operational and strategic levels, is exactly how we can better prepare leaders for tomorrow. Future leaders in the Joint Force must be capable of more rapidly understanding their tactical tasks within the context of the operational and strategic objectives.

U.S. Army draft doctrine currently proposes that a systems analysis and an effects-based approach to planning or assessment are designed for use only at the strategic and operational levels by properly resourced joint staffs.³¹ Although the Army's point about a lack of staff expertise is probably valid below division level, it is just such resistance that will continue to limit the ability of future leaders to operate within uncertain and complex environments that require the complex integration of Joint Force and interagency capabilities. Although an extremely difficult problem set, an effects-based approach cannot be dismissed by Service doctrine because it is a far more productive approach to understanding the complexities of our adversaries in both the current and emerging security environment. Allowing each service to diverge from previously agreed upon joint doctrine is a mistake that will cause future problems for the Joint Force as each Service is required to operate "seamlessly" within the joint planning

and execution system. The earlier in career development that an effects-based approach can be understood by both military and civilians within the interagency, the better prepared our future leaders will be to accept the challenges of tomorrow.

Therefore, in order to be effective as future senior leaders, junior officers and government civilians should be required to study an effects-based approach to planning within the first five years of service in order to understand the required effects integration in the current planning process. Conducting tasks in order to set conditions and achieve objectives is part of all Service doctrine. The current environment now calls for soldiers to conduct tactical tasks to set the conditions to achieve strategic objectives. For this reason, it is imperative that military leaders understand an effects-based approach within an operational context not later than the career course. Today's junior military leaders and new civilian leaders are asked to advise their superiors on some of the most complex situations with strategic implications. The Joint Force cannot expect good results unless it starts to frame the problem and give the leaders the tools to make informed decisions earlier in their careers. Junior leaders must be educated to study their strategic security environment from the beginning of their careers.

While the Services' cannot afford to dilute basic leader skills by including instruction on EBA, they also cannot afford to postpone a basic education of an EBA. Therefore, EBA instruction will have to be additive to the current career courses. This will increase the educational tempo for new leaders, yet understanding an EBA is essential to provide the framework to build better future leaders.

By the tenth year in military service, most leaders have acquired a well-rounded tactical and technical knowledge base to help guide them through their careers. Given

this developed base, it is imperative that military and civilian leaders come together at the Intermediate Level Education (ILE) and undertake a more advanced study of the effects-based approach within an operational and strategic context.³² Majors and Lieutenant Colonels are the action officers on theater and strategic level staffs that must possess a clear understanding of the EBP process in order for it to be successful. It is also important that civilians from all government departments are included in the ILE student forum to ensure a broad exchange of military and non-military capabilities within this same process.

It is imperative that the Joint Force work together to develop an interactive and effects-oriented leader development model that is designed to produce leaders capable of thriving in violent, uncertain, and complex environments. The Joint Force must now focus on challenging leaders with problems that not only have no “set solution,” they literally have no solution. When a problem set is no longer focused on task and objective accomplishment, leaders are forced to think about degrees of success. This is where an effects-based approach will finally start to make sense to our future leaders. Therefore, EBA must be introduced at the career course level and emphasized at intermediate level educational courses.

Leaders who have served in Afghanistan and Iraq understand an effects-based approach and achieving certain degrees of success more than those who have not experienced this problem set. Task accomplishment no longer provides the conditional feedback that commanders require to monitor success. Training leaders to think in terms of desired effects, setting conditions and assigning tasks to achieve them, and teaching subordinates to monitor for indicators of incremental success becomes the true

aim of future training plans. Given this interdependence at all levels, it becomes evident that Service doctrine must incorporate an effects-based approach and train leaders throughout their careers to fully implement this concept at all levels.

Finally, the Department of Defense (DoD) must enforce these institutional changes in order to ensure Joint and all Service doctrine reflects and instills these changes across all military and DoD civilian leadership. Additionally, DoD must also be prepared to assume the role as Executive Agent and ensure that the interagency departments are involved in order to ensure better integration of planning between all elements.

Conclusion

The year 1862 was another time of violent, uncertain, and complex security environment in our nation's history. Abraham Lincoln shared some keen insights on the need to adapt in his closing remarks to Congress that same year:

The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew.³³

Although not faced with internal civil strife, his message remains valid today given the complexities of the security environment and the uncertainty of many global actors. The future Joint Force's ability to successfully operate in a VUCA environment is critical to the security of our nation. DoD adoption of effects-based planning is the best approach at theater level, given this environment, to set the conditions for this success. It is now incumbent upon our senior leaders, working with other government departments, to make the doctrinal, organizational, and institutional changes needed to help set these conditions. The Joint Force is currently not fully preparing our units and future leaders

for success as it continues to apply twentieth century methods to twenty-first century problems.

There is general agreement throughout the Joint Force that change is necessary, but there are Service issues with an effects-based planning approach that must be adjudicated by DoD in order to focus our efforts on a complex problem set. The Joint Force continues to have difficulty integrating and planning with other interagency elements and must attempt to close this gap. An effects-based planning approach is the best chance to gain a more common understanding, true interoperability, a focused set of desired outcomes, and required actions from all elements. If the Joint Force is going to remain as dominant in the future security environment as it has in the past, the leadership must embrace an effects-based planning and decisionmaking approach to enable success in a more complex and uncertain fight.

Endnotes

¹ Robert M. Klein, *Joint Force Quarterly*, "Adaptive Planning: Not your Grandfather's Schlieffen Plan," Issue 45, (2d Quarter 2007), 84.

² Army Research Office, *Efficient Effects-based Military Planning*, available from <http://www.ecse.rpi.edu/~cvrl/EBO/ebo.htm>; Internet; accessed 28 January 2008.

³ Joint Publication 5.0, Joint Operation Planning, 26 December 2006; available from http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp5_0.pdf; Internet; accessed 18 Dec 07, IV-8. Hereafter cited as JP 5.0.

⁴ The author served as a Battalion Commander in and around Baghdad for 14 months in 03-04, as well as the MNC-I Chief of Plans for twelve months from Jan to Dec 06. He was responsible for the MNC-I strategy and input on the MNF-I Campaign plan, as well as the assessment process to measure the achievement of stated operational and theater objectives.

⁵ U.S. Joint Forces Command J9, *Effects-based Operations*, White Paper Version 1.0, (Suffolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 18 October 2001), i.

⁶ *Ibid.*, i.

⁷ *Ibid.*, ii.

⁸ JP 5.0, III-14.

⁹ Ibid., ii.

¹⁰ David Fastabend, *EBO and the Classical Elements of Operational Design*. briefing slides with commentary, Arlington, VA: US Army Futures Center, January 31, 2006.

¹¹ United States Marine Corps, *Effects-Based Operations Conference*, briefing slides with commentary, Quantico, VA: US Marine Corps Concept Development Center, September 7, 2006.

¹² JP 5.0, I-4.

¹³ JP 5.0, III-16.

¹⁴ Tom McDaniel, *A Common Perspective*, *Effects-Based Operations: The Next American Way of War*, Volume 12, May 2004; available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/comm_per/common_perspective.htm; Internet; accessed 11 January 2008, 16.

¹⁵ United States Joint Forces Command: Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander's Handbook for an Effects-based Approach to Joint Operations*, 24 February 2006; available from http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfcom/ebo_handbook_2006.pdf; Internet; accessed 29 November 2007, IV-6.

¹⁶ Ibid. IV-7.

¹⁷ Ibid., III-19.

¹⁸ National Security Council, *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*, November 30, 2005; available from http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_strategy_nov2005.html; Internet; accessed 14 January 2008, 25-26.

¹⁹ Ibid., 24.

²⁰ Ibid., 25.

²¹ Ibid., 29-35.

²² JP 5.0, III-58.

²³ MNF-I operates with a Strategic Operations including an effects element. Strategic Plans and Policy is an entirely different division. MNC-I operates with a complete C-staff, but has added a Brigadier General as the Effects Coordinator.

²⁴ Campaign planning was a completely separate cell from the Strategic Plans and Strategic Effects divisions. These elements met for azimuth checks, but lost continuity by not being a cohesive planning element. The separate staff cells were not provided oversight and guidance from the same General Officer on the MNF-I staff.

²⁵ United States Joint Forces Command: Joint Warfighting Center, *Commander's Handbook for an Effects-based Approach to Joint Operations*, 24 February 2006; available from

http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/jfcom/ebo_handbook_2006.pdf; Internet; accessed 29 November 2007, A-5.

²⁶ Battle handover in this context refers to the widely-accepted process by which contingency plans are transferred to future and current operations for execution. This process requires at a minimum a rudimentary understanding of the contingency plans by both future and current operations. This requires shared information, attendance at planning meetings, and well-chosen planners in future operations.

²⁷ Term reach-back here refers to the ability to have one member from a staff directorate permanently placed within the contingency planning cell while the predominance of the other functional effects planners and coordinators reside within the effects coordination cell.

²⁸ United States Joint Forces Command, *Joint Operating Concepts: Major Combat Operations*; 8 June 2004; available from http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/draftmco_joc.doc; Internet; accessed 19 December 2007, 17.

²⁹ These are observations gained from personal experience attending numerous effects coordination meetings while on the Multinational Corps in Iraq staff and working effects oriented meetings at Multinational Force in Iraq headquarters.

³⁰ U.S. Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 3-0, (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 27 February, 2008), Appendix E, E-13.

³¹ Ibid., E-12. US Army doctrine in the next sentence acknowledges that joint interdependence requires Army staffs to understand joint doctrine and address these methods when participating in joint planning or assessment.

³² According to the Department of the Army Inspector General, the concept of bringing Interagency civilians into the ILE student base is being examined currently by the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command for potential incorporation in the 2009 or 2010 timeframe. This fact was conveyed to the USAWC during a series of small group discussions following an address to the students.

³³ Abraham Lincoln, *Annual Address to Congress*; 1 December 1862, available from <http://showcase.netins.net/web/creative/lincoln/speeches/congress.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2008.